Statute of Limitations

Florida's personal injury lawsuit statute of limitations varies depending ont he type of injury claim at issue.

The purpose of personal injury law is to protect the victims of negligence, inaction, or recklessness of another individual.

Personal injury law extends to a wide variety of cases which can include: dog bites, car/boat accidents, construction accidents, medical malpractice, defective products, wrongful death, nursing home abuse, and slip and fall injuries.

Before making a personal injury claim, you should have an idea of what Florida's statute of limitation (the entire chapter is reprinted here, including non-injury claims) may hold in store for it:

CHAPTER 95

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS

95.011  Applicability.

95.03  Contracts shortening time.

95.031  Computation of time.

95.04  Promise to pay barred debt.

95.051  When limitations tolled.

95.091  Limitation on actions to collect taxes.

95.10  Cause of action arising in another state.

95.11  Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.

95.111  Limitations after death of a person served by publication.

95.12  Real property actions.

95.13  Real property actions; possession by legal owner presumed.

95.14  Real property actions; limitation upon action founded upon title.

95.16  Real property actions; adverse possession under color of title.

95.18  Real property actions; adverse possession without color of title.

95.191  Limitations when tax deed holder in possession.

95.192  Limitation upon acting against tax deeds.

95.21  Adverse possession against lands purchased at sales made by executors.

95.22  Limitation upon claims by remaining heirs, when deed made by one or more.

95.231  Limitations where deed or will on record.

95.281  Limitations; instruments encumbering real property.

95.35  Termination of contracts to purchase real estate in which there is no maturity date.

95.36  Dedications to municipalities or counties for park purposes.

95.361  Roads presumed to be dedicated.

95.011  Applicability.--A civil action or proceeding, called "action" in this chapter, including one brought by the state, a public officer, a political subdivision of the state, a municipality, a public corporation or body corporate, or any agency or officer of any of them, or any other governmental authority, shall be barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chapter or, if a different time is prescribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere.

History.--s. 1, ch. 74-382; s. 1, ch. 77-174.

95.03  Contracts shortening time.--Any provision in a contract fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.

History.--ss. 1, 2, ch. 6465, 1913; RGS 2931; CGL 4651; s. 2, ch. 74-382.

95.031  Computation of time.--Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s. 95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.

(1)  A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. For the purposes of this chapter, the last element constituting a cause of action on an obligation or liability founded on a negotiable or nonnegotiable note payable on demand or after date with no specific maturity date specified in the note, and the last element constituting a cause of action against any endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable on any such obligation or liability founded on any such note, is the first written demand for payment, notwithstanding that the endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable has executed a separate writing evidencing such liability.

(2)(a)  An action founded upon fraud under s. 95.11(3), including constructive fraud, must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.

(b)  An action for products liability under s. 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s. 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection. Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover for harm allegedly caused by a product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. All products, except those included within subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2., are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less.

1.  Aircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, vessels of more than 100 gross tons, railroad equipment used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, and improvements to real property, including elevators and escalators, are not subject to the statute of repose provided within this subsection.

2.  Any product not listed in subparagraph 1., which the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, as having an expected useful life exceeding 10 years, has an expected useful life commensurate with the time period indicated by the warranty or label. Under such circumstances, no action for products liability may be brought after the expected useful life of the product, or more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product, whichever is later.

3.  With regard to those products listed in subparagraph 1., except for escalators, elevators, and improvements to real property, no action for products liability may be brought more than 20 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessor who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. However, if the manufacturer specifically warranted, through express representation or labeling, that the product has an expected useful life exceeding 20 years, the repose period shall be the time period warranted in representations or label.

(c)  The repose period prescribed in paragraph (b) does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose period.

(d)  The repose period prescribed within paragraph (b) is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect. Any claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and legal support. Maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets does not constitute concealment under this section.

History.--s. 3, ch. 74-382; s. 1, ch. 75-234; s. 2, ch. 77-54; ss. 1, 2, ch. 78-289; s. 1, ch. 78-418; s. 1, ch. 80-280; s. 44, ch. 81-259; s. 10, ch. 85-80; s. 2, ch. 86-272; s. 2, ch. 90-105; s. 11, ch. 99-225; s. 20, ch. 2003-154.

95.04  Promise to pay barred debt.--An acknowledgment of, or promise to pay, a debt barred by a statute of limitations must be in writing and signed by the person sought to be charged.

History.--s. 1, ch. 4375, 1895; GS 1717; RGS 2930; CGL 4650; s. 6, ch. 74-382.

95.051  When limitations tolled.--

(1)  The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is tolled by:

(a)  Absence from the state of the person to be sued.

(b)  Use by the person to be sued of a false name that is unknown to the person entitled to sue so that process cannot be served on the person to be sued.

(c)  Concealment in the state of the person to be sued so that process cannot be served on him or her.

(d)  The adjudicated incapacity, before the cause of action accrued, of the person entitled to sue. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.

(e)  Voluntary payments by the alleged father of the child in paternity actions during the time of the payments.

(f)  The payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument.

(g)  The pendency of any arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of the action.

(h)  The minority or previously adjudicated incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.

Paragraphs (a)-(c) shall not apply if service of process or service by publication can be made in a manner sufficient to confer jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. This section shall not be construed to limit the ability of any person to initiate an action within 30 days of the lifting of an automatic stay issued in a bankruptcy action as is provided in 11 U.S.C. s. 108(c).